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intepretations would work to defeat the apparent intent of the Vir-
ginia legislature to place the burden of liability upon the party
actually responsible for the loss.
Virginia courts might justifiably be persuaded to follow the guide-
lines set out in the California statute since the apparent purpose of
both statutes is essentially the same. It is certainly conceivable, how-
ever, that Virginia courts may apply the statute strictly as it was writ-
ten on the theory that if the Virginia legislature had meant to adopt
the California rule, it would have adopted all of the language of the
California statute. Regardless of what course of action the Virginia
courts choose to follow, however, it is clear that the General Assembly
has taken a step in the direction of endorsing the principle that the
liability arising out of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle
should follow the driver rather than the vehicle.45
DAVID L. Ross
PROVIDING HUMAN ORGANS FOR
MEDICAL TRANSPLANT
The recent success experienced by surgeons in homotransplanta-
tions, especially in cardiac transplantations, raises an issue of the com-
patibility of law and science in this rapidly expanding area of medical
endeavor.1 The immediate problem presented by this scientific ad-
vancement is the creation of a legally acceptable procedure whereby
usable organs can be made available to surgeons for use in homotrans-
plantations. 2 Existing case law and statutory provisions concerning
dead bodies are inadequate to meet the needs of transplanting sur-
4It has been suggested that the entire concept of automobile liability in-
surance should be revised; and, that by requiring the driver rather than the
vehicle to be insured, many of the controversial problems relating to such items
as "double coverage" and conflicting "other insurance" clauses could be eliminated.
See, Logan, Insure the Driver, 457 INs. L.J. 682 (1968).
3See e.g., N.Y. Times, May 8, 1968, § A at 23, col. 1. The Deputy District
Attorney for the City of Los Angeles maintains that murder is technically committed
in many transplant situations because of the uncertainty of the legal definition
of death.
-Physicians have made and are making great progress in protecting human
lives by the use of "spare parts." Vestal, Taber 9: Shoemaker, Medico-Legal Aspects
of Tissue Homotransplantation, 18 U. DET. L.J. 271 (1955). Organ transplantations,
from a simple blood transfusion to the more complex therapeutics such as skin
grafts and kidney transplants have been performed for many years. Couch, Curran
& MOORE, The Use of Cadaver Tissues in Transplantations, 271 NEw ENG. J.
MEDICINE 691 (1964).
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geons and the complexity of this problem points to the fact that a
re-evaluation of legal concepts is necessary in order to keep pace with
medical science.
In order to supply surgeons with suitable organs Virginia recently
enacted the first homotransplantation statute.3 The statute provides
that when there is a patient "in immediate need" of "an internal
organ as a transplant," "the Chief Medical Examiner or his dep-
uties" may "in their discretion" and upon "request of the transplant-
ing surgeon," supply such an organ from any "decedent who comes
under their jurisdiction" if "there is insufficient time" during which
the viability of the organ may be maintained to obtain consent from
the next of kin, and "no known objection by the next of kin is fore-
seen," and the taking of the organ will not interfere with any subse-
quent investigation or autopsy.
The objective of this statute and its significance become apparent
when it is read in light of the prior case and statutory law dealing
with dead bodies. At common law it was early recognized that a liv-
ing person had a legal right to a decent burial. This right, accorded to
him after death, 4 has been construed to mean that an individual has
the right to be buried as soon as possible after death and to remain
interred.5 The right to a decent burial, however, has not always meant
that the deceased's wishes about the disposition of his body are to be
followed. Although great weight is given to the deceased's wishes,6
the courts have sometimes acceded to the wishes of the relatives in
3In any case where a patient is in immediate need for an internal organ
as a transplant, the Chief Medical Examiner or his deputies where a
decedent comes under their jurisdiction; who may provide a suitable organ
for transplant and there is insufficient time to contact the next of kin of
the decedent in order to maintain the viability of the organ to be trans-
planted, and no known objection by the next of kin is foreseen by the
Chief Medical Examiner or his deputies; the Chief Medical Examiner or
his deputies may in their discretion where providing the organ for trans-
plant will not interfere with subsequent course of the investigation or
autopsy provide such organ on the request of the transplanting surgeon.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-46.1 (Supp. 1968). This bill was approved on April 2, 1968
as Chapter 305 of the Virginia Acts of Assembly 1968 and became effective on
July 1, 1968.
'Finley v. Atlantic Transp. Co., 22o N.Y. 249, 115 N.E. 715 (1917); Persinger
v. Persinger, 39 Ohio Op. 315, 86 N.E.2d 335 (1949); Kitchen v. Wilkinson, 26 Pa.
Super. 75 (1904).
OKing v. Frame, 204 Iowa 1074, 216 N.W. 63o (1927); Pettigrew v. Pettigrew,
207 Pa. 313, 56 A. 878 (19o4). See Hoeberle v. Weber, 56 N.J. Super. 428, 153
A.2d 390 (1959).
'Thompson v. Deeds, 93 Iowa 228, 61 N.W. 842 (1895); Fidelity Union Trust
Co. v. Heller, 16 N.J. Super. 285, 84 A.2d 485 (1951); Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic
Church, 262 N.Y. 32o, 186 N.E. 798 (1933); Goldman v. Mollen, 168 Va. 345, 191
S.E. 627 (1937).
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an attempt to balance the interests involved.7 In order to effectuate
the right to a decent burial the law has imposed a duty upon the
surviving spouse, then the next of kin and, in the absence of kin,
upon the public to provide a decent burial.8
The courts, in order to facilitate the performance of this duty of
burial, have resorted to the concept 9 that there is a "quasi-property"
right in the dead body that is coextensive with the duty of decent
burial.10 If this right to possession of the body is interfered with, the
courts have recognized a cause of action in favor of the person en-
titled to possession." Other courts have realized that the concept of a
"quasi-property" right in a dead body is a fiction.12 These courts rec-
ognize that there is a right to possession of the body and that relief can
be given without any reference to the law of property because what
are really being protected are the sensibilities of the next of kin. This
same judicial policy in favor of protecting the sensibilities of the next
of kin has had several other consequences. The courts have held
that the person entitled to the body has an immediate right to posses-
sion of the body13 and a right to receive the body in the same con-
dition (including all of its parts) that it was in at the time of death.
14
Thus, delay in delivery of the body to the next of kin 15 or any mutila-
tion of the body' 6 will give rise to a cause of action.
7E.g., Holland v. Metalious, io 5 N.H. 290, 198 A.2d 654 (1964).
'McClellen v. Filson, 44 Ohio St. 184, 5 N.E. 861 (1886); Love v. Aetna Cas.
Sur. Co., 99 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
OIt seems reasonably obvious that such [a concept as quasi-property] ...
is something evolved out of thin air to meet the occasion, and that it is ...
a fiction likely to deceive no one but a lawyer.
W. PROSSER, TORTS § i, at 51 (3d ed. 1964).
"Anderson v. Acheson, 132 Iowa 744, 11o N.W. 335 (19o7); Seaton v. Com-
monwealth, 149 Ky. 498, 149 S.W. 871 (1912); Barela v. Frank A. Hubbell Co.,
67 N.M. 319, 355 P.2d 133 (1g6o); Finley v. Atlantic Transp. Co., 220o N.Y. 249,
115 N.E. 715 (1917); Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. 313, 56 A. 878 (1904);
Simpkins v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 200 S.C. 228, 2o S.E.2d 733 (1942); England
v. Central Pocahontas Coal Co., 86 W. Va. 575, 104 S.E. 46 (190o); Koerber v.
Patek, 123 Wis. 435, 102 N.W. 40 (1905).
uSouthern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 21 Ala. App. 5, 105 So. 161 (1925);
Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891); Hassard v. Lehane, 143 App.
Div. 424, 128 N.Y.S. 161 (1911); Love v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 99 S.W.2d 646 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1936).
UStephens v. Waits, 53 Ga. App. 44, 184 S.E. 781 (1936); Gadbury v. Bleitz,
133 Wash. 134, 233 P. 299 (1925).
'1Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891); Lott v. State, 32 Misc.
2d 296, 225 N.Y.S.2d 434 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Gatzow v. Buening, io6 Wis. 1, 81 N.W.
1003 (19oo).
"In re Disinterment of Jarvis, 244 Iowa 1025, 58 N.W.2d 24 (1953); Hassard
v. Lehane, 143 App. Div. 424, 128 N.Y.S. 161 (1911); Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis.
435, 102 N.W. 40 (1905).
"Louisville 8: N.R.R. v. Hull, 113 Ky. 561, 68 S.W. 433 (19o2); Schmidt v.
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In addition to the common law, the statutes of every state contain
numerous provisions dealing with dead bodies. These statutes can be
conveniently grouped into three generic types: the anatomy statutes;
the autopsy statutes; and the donation statutes.
The first legislation that dealt with dead bodies was the anatomy
laws. These laws,17 in thirty-five jurisdictions, were a reflection of
medical and legislative concern with the acquisition of cadavers to be
used for medical training 8 and they provide that unclaimed bodies
otherwise required to be buried at public expense could be delivered
to medical schools or State Anatomical Boards for scientific purposes. 9
While these statutes change the common law to the extent that the
deceased's right to a decent burial is postponed until the body is
through being used for pedagogical purposes, 2 0 the deceased's right
to an eventual decent burial has been maintained.
21
Several writers have suggested that the anatomy laws could be con-
strued to allow the taking of organs for the purpose of homotrans-
plantations. 2 As a practical matter, however, such a construction
would accomplish little because the time period for which a body must
be held under these statutes23 renders the body and its parts useless
Schmidt, 49 Misc. 2d 498, 267 N.Y.S.2d 645 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Parker v. Quinn-
McGowen Co., 262 N.C. 560, 138 S.E.2d 214 (1964); Hole v. Bonner, 82 Tex. 33,
17 S.W. 605 (1891).
1"Dunahoo v. Bess, 146 Fla. 182, 200 So. 541 (1941) (negligent embalming);
Nail v. McCullough & Lee, 88 Okla. 243, 212 P. 981 (1923)) (mutilation of the
body as a result of a negligent accident on the way to the burial); Nichols v.
Central Vermont Ry., 94 Vt. 14, 1o9 A. 905 (1919) (negligent damage to corpse);
Kneass v. Cremation Soc'y, 1O3 Wash. 521, 175 P. 172 (1918) (negligent loss of
deceased's ashes).
ITFor a collection of these statutes, see Appendix I.
'1 Note, Legal Problems in Donations of Human Tissues to Medical Science,
21 VAND. L. REV. 352, 353 (1968).
2OComment, The Law of Dead Bodies: Impeding Medical Progress, 19 OHIo
ST. L.J. 455, 459 (1958)-
2mSee Note, Legal Problems in Donations of Human Tissues to Medical Science,
21 VAND. L. REV. 352, 354 (1968).
21See, e.g., Burke v. New York University, 196 App. Div. 491, 188 N.Y.S. 123
(1921) (N.Y. Pen. Law of 19o9) § 2215 provided that a body should be buried
after it was used; defendant cremated the body instead and it was held liable to
the plaintiff for damages. This provision was later repealed by Law of April 15,
1955, c. 355, § 2 N.Y. Laws (1955)).
22Packel, Spare Parts for the Human Engine, 37 PA. BAR ASS'N Q. 71, 75
(1965); Note, Legal Problems in Donations of Human Tissues to Mwdical Science,
21 VAND. L. Rlv. 352, 355 (1968); Note, Donation of Dead Bodies and Parts Thereof
for Medical Use, 21 U. PIT. L. REv. 523, 534 (ig6o).
2E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7202 (West 1955) (3o day wait); MAss.
ANN. LAws ch. 113 § 1 (1957) (14 day wait).
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for anything but pedagogical purposes. 24 It is for this very reason that
the transplantation statute allows the medical examiner to act within
a time period measured by the viability of the organ to be trans-
planted.25 Furthermore, even if medical science could develop a tech-
nique that would preserve cadavers indefinitely, cadavers would pro-
vide little transplant material either because of the cause of death or
because of the age and physical condition of the deceased.20 In con-
trast, under the transplantation statute, the number of potential donors
is much greater. Anyone falling within the statutory jurisdiction of the
medical examiner is a potential donor, even though the body may
subsequently be claimed. This jurisdiction includes any decedent who
died by "violence, or suddenly when in apparent health, or when un-
attended by a physician, or in prison, or in any suspicious, unusual or
unnatural manner....- 2 7
The second type of legislation concerning dead bodies is the au-
topsy laws. An autopsy is the "inspection, and usually partial dissec-
tion, of a dead body which has been opened so as to expose important
organs either to ascertain the cause of death or... any other ab-
normalties present .... 28 The basis of these laws is that in certain cir-
cumstances the public has an interest in ascertaining the cause of
death29 and, to that extent, the common law rights of the next of kin
to immediate possession of the body are modified. 30 Thus far, how-
ever, the public interest has not been judicially construed to allow
organs obtained by autopsy to be used for transplantation purposes.
In fact, it was early recognized that the unauthorized retention of any
internal part, other than those needed for microscopic study, gives
rise to a cause of action against the coroner. 31 Furthermore, even
if the autopsy statutes were revised to allow permanent retention of
body parts, they would still not be an important source of trans-
"Couch, Curran & Moore, The Use of Cadaver Tissues in Transplantation,
271 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 691 (1964).
EVA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-46.1 (Supp. 1968).
"Interview with Dr. Geoffrey Mann, Chief Medical Examiner of the Com-
monwealth of Virginia, in Richmond, Virginia, November 14, 1968.
2VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-41 (Repl. Vol. 196o).
2In re Disinterment of Jarvis, 244 Iowa 1025, 58 N.W.2d 24, 28 (1953), citing,
M. WEBSTER, NEW INVL DICTIONARY 188 (2d ed. 1952).
OPalenzke v. Bruning, 98 I1l. App. 644 (1900); Young v. College of Physicians,
81 Md. 358, 32 A. 177 (1895); Sturgeon v. Crosby Mortuary, 14o Neb. 82, 299
N.W. 378 (1941); Stason, The Role of Law in Medical Progess, 32 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 563, 569 (1967).
-"See, e.g. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-43 (Repl. Vol. ig6o) .
*Palenzke v. Bruning, 98 Ill. App. 644 (xgoo); In re Disinterment of Jarvis,
244 Iowa 1025, 58 N.W.2d 24 (1953); Hassard v. Lehane, 143 App. Div. 424, 128
N.Y.S. 161 (1911).
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plant material since the autopsy is normally not performed until too
long after death to maintain the viability of the organ.32
The only legislation that has been directly addressed to the need
for providing transplant material is the so-called "donation statutes."33
Although they vary in substance,3 4 their purpose is to allow the in-
dividual or, under some statutes, his survivors, to donate the de-
ceased's body or parts thereof to science.35 Under the common law
there was no property right in a dead body that would permit a gift
of it;36 therefore, to accomplish a gift these statutes give a general
grant of authority to a person either to dispose of37 or to make a gift
of his body.38 At the present time a Uniform Anatomical Gift Act is in
the process of being completed.39 While this act will modernize and
make uniform the basic purposes of the donation statutes, its effects
will still be limited by the small number of people who specifically
bequeath organs.4 Both the donation statutes and the Uniform Act
are of limited value in supplying emergency transplant material be-
cause unless prearrangements have been made, vital organs such as the
heart, liver, or kidney will lose their viability before the donation can
be ascertained and completed.4 1
Thus, prior to the passage of the transplantation statute, no law
existed which could supply transplant material to surgeons within
the narrow time limits imposed by the present state of medical tech-
nology.4 2 The Virginia transplantation statute is an important step
-Couch, Curran & Moore, The Use of Cadaver Tissues in Transplantations,
271 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 691, 692 (1964).
-For a collection of these statutes, see Appendix II.
4Compare CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7100 (West Supp. 1968) (the entire
body or any part of it) with W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-19-i (1966) (eyes only).
r -Stason, The Role of Law in Medical Progress, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
563, 570 (1967).
3'See Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891); Note, Legal Problems
in Donations of Human Tissues to Medical Science, 21 VAND. L. REV. 352, 356
(1968).
3E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-4o8 (Repl. Vol. 196o); VA. CODE ANN. § 32-364.1
(Supp. 1968).
mE.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.523(1) (Supp. 1968).
HUNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACr (Final Draft, July 26, 1968).
IOStason, The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 23 BUSINEss LAWYER 919 (1968).
"Couch, Curran & Moore, The Use of Cadaver Tissues in Transplatations,
271 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 691 (1964).
-Stason, The Role of Law in Medical Progress, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 563,
568 (1967).
Cadaver tissues for transplantation are divided into two groups accord-
ing to the urgency with which they must be salvaged.
Critical tissues are those whose usefullness depends upon their vi-
ability, but whose viability is lost so rapidly at normal temperatures that
1969]
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forward because it provides transplant material to patients in im-
mediate need of an internal organ in situations where previous legis-
lation was ineffectual. Under the statute the time period during which
an organ's viability can be maintained is the crucial factor and per-




One problem of immediate importance is the possible conflict be-
tween the transplantation statute and the Virginia donation statute.
In Virginia, any person who has attained the age of twenty-one and
who is of sound mind, can by will or instrument executed in the same
manner as a will, prescribe the disposition of his body or parts there-
of.44 It should be noted that the transplantation statute allows the
Medical Examiner to obtain organs within the relatively short period
of time in which they must be used. In order to accomplish this, the
statute allows the Medical Examiner to take the organ without con-
sent where "there is insufficient time to contact the next of kin of the
decedent in order to maintain the viability of the organ to be trans-
planted." This same crucially short period of time would generally
not allow the Medical Examiner to determine if the decedent had
willed or donated his body or parts thereof.45 In the event that such
a conflict should occur it is probable that the transplantation statute
would be controlling. Where a subsequent enactment is in conflict
with a prior enactment, it is often held that the subsequent enactment
effects a pro tanto repeal by implication of the prior enactment.40
This possible conflict between the two statutes is inexorably in-
volved with the rights of potential donees under the transplantation
post-mortem legal procedures, tissue procurement and transplantation
must be completed in a matter of minutes....
Couch, Curron & Moore, The Use of Cadaver Tissues in Transplatations, 271
NEw ENG. J. MEDICINE 691 (1964).
"VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-46.1 (Supp. 1968).
"VA. CODE ANN. § 82-864.1 (Supp. 1968).
Under the proposed Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, any individual
who is eighteen years of age and of sound mind may make a gift of his
body or any parts thereof by a will or by any document that is signed
by the donor and witnessed by two people. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT
AcT §§ 2(a), 4(a), (b) (Final Draft, 1968).
15There are critical organs such as the kidney, liver or heart that must be
removed from the deceased within forty-five minutes after death to maintain their
viability. Couch, Curran & Moore, The Use of Cadaver Tissues in Transplantation,
271 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 691 (1964).
"'Berry v. Gordon, 237 Ark. 547, 376 S.W.2d 279 (1964); People v. Kuhn, 216
Cal. App. 2d 695, 81 Cal. Rptr. 253 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (alternative holding);
Ferch v. People, 1o Colo. 471, 74 P.2d 712 (1937)-
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and donation statutes. Potential donees may include individuals,
4 7
medical schools 43 and organ banks.49 The conflict would almost cer-
tainly arise where the Medical Examiner had given an organ to a
transplanting surgeon without knowledge that the organ or the
entire body had been previously donated to a particular individual
or organization. The question that arises then is whether the poten-
tial donee has a cause of action. The existence of a cause of action for
the taking of a body organ that was the subject of a valid will or gift
has never been judicially determined.5 0 However, by analogy to either
the law of wills or to the law of gifts it would seem probable that the
potential donee has a legally protected right. Under the wills analogy,
the gift of the organ or of the entire body5' would vest at the time of
death5 2 and create an enforceable right to the bequest in the donee.
53
An interference with that right, even an innocent one, might impose
liability on the interfering person.5 4 Under the gift analogy, the exe-
cution of the instrument of gift should supply both donative intent
and constructive delivery.5 5 The right to the gift would become en-
forceable at the death of the donor and a cause of action might lie for
wrongfully taking the property of the donee. However, since the
donee's right was created by a statute, there is no fundamental objec-
tion to the abridgement of that right by a subsequent statute.
A necessary consequence of making time the controlling factor
under the transplantation statute is that the legal rights of the next
of kin must be modified. As stated above, the "quasi-property" right
47E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7100 (West Supp. 1968) .
"E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-139a (Supp. 1968).
'"E.g., Aaiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-841 (1956).
""The only statute to deal with a problem that is even remotely related to this
problem is CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-139b (Supp. 1968) which provides that a
valid gift of the donor's entire body shall take precedence over a gift of any
portion thereof when there are conflicting gifts.
aThe question of whether a person can bequeath an organ does not arise
because the donation statutes specifically confer that right. E.g., VA. CODE ANN.
§ 32-364.1 (Supp. 1968).
'-'See generally Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556 (19.12); Kellar v. Kasper,
138 F. Supp. 738 (D. S.D. 1956); Rogoski v. McLaughlin, 228 Ark. 1157, 312 S.W.2d
912 (1958).
ln re Estate of Bixby, 295 P.2d 68, 140 Cal. App. 2d 326 (Dist. Ct. App.
1956); In re Estate of Giberson, 21 Misc. 2d 299, 194 N.Y.S.2d 686 (Sur. Ct. 1959);
In re Schwartz, 2 Misc. 2d 542, 149 N.Y.S.2d 638 (Sur. Ct. 1956).
r4See generally McGregor v. McGregor, l1 F. Supp. 848 (D. Colo. 1951) (de-
fendant represented earlier will as later will); Morton v. Petitt, 124 Ohio St. 241,
177 N.E. 591 (1931) (defendant destroyed real will and substituted forgery).
r5DeMouy v. Jepson, 255 Ala. 337, 51 So. 2d 5o6 (1951) (dictum); Berl v. Rosen-
berg, 336 P.2d 975, 169 Cal. App. 2d 125 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959); In re Kaufman's
Estate, 201 Misc. 905, 107 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Sur. Ct. 1951).
66 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVI
in the next of kin for the purpose of giving the body a decent burial
has been interpreted to mean that the person entitled to the body
has an immediate right to possession of the body56 and a right to
receive the body in the same condition (including all of its parts)
that it was in at the time of death.57 While it is clear that the statute
changes the common law to the extent that the state may alter the
body before returning it to the next of kin, the statute makes no
mention of the condition the body must be in when returned. Delay
in delivery of the body to the next of kin has long been recognized as
giving a cause of action for mental distress to those entitled to the
body.5 Similarly, mutilation of the body, including retention of
internal body parts,59 also gives rise to a cause of action for mental
distress.60 While a reasonableness requirement might be read into
the statute which would cover both delay and unnecessary retention
and mutilation, until such time as this could be judicially settled, the
deceased's survivors would have no clearly defined statement with
respect to their rights.
The liability of the Medical Examiner with regard to mutilation
of a body also inheres in the wording of the statute. The statute pro-
vides that the Chief Medical Examiner or his deputies may provide
an organ from a decedent "who may provide a suitable organ for
transplant ..... 61 If it subsequently appears that an organ was taken
from the deceased's body and that the organ was not suitable, the
Medical Examiner might incur liability for an unnecessary mutilation
of the body. It is obvious that the Medical Examiner cannot know
with certainty that the organ will be suitable until the body is
opened and the organ extracted.62 The resolution of this problem
depends upon the standard that the word "may" imposes on the
Medical Examiner. If the general rule of statutory construction is
applied then "may" will be held to give the Medical Examiner a
wide latitude of discretion63 and he will be held liable only for a
clear abuse of that discretion.64 If a court were to hold otherwise,
5OCases cited note 13 supra.
5-Cases cited note 14 supra.
58Cases cited note 15 supra.
W°E.g., Hassard v. Lehane, 143 App. Div. 424, 128 N.Y.S. 161 (1911) (physician
retained heart and spleen after autopsy); accord, Gray v. Southern Pac. Co., 68
P.2d lO1, 21 Cal. App. 2d 240 (Dist. Ct. App. 1937); Palenzke v. Bruning, 98 111.
App. 644 (19oo)-
wCases cited note 16 supra.
61VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-46.1 (Supp. 1968) (emphasis added).
'2Interview cited note 26 supra.
'See generally U.S. v. Bowden, 182 F.2d 251 (ioth Cir. 1950); (the word "may"
vests discretion); State v. Machovec, 236 Iowa 377, 17 N.W.2d 843 (1945); (word
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the fear of liability would, as a practical matter, render the statute
useless. 65
The transplantation statute requires several other factual de-
terminations in which the Medical Examiner must exercise a sub-
stantial degree of discretion. In order for the statute to operate there
must be a patient "who is in immediate need for an internal organ
as a transplant." It is not clear from the statute whether this determi-
nation is to be made by the transplanting surgeon or by the Medical
Examiner.66 Similarly, the statute is silent on the criteria to be used
in arriving at this determination. If it should later be determined
that the organ was taken in a situation in which the need was not
immediate, the question would arise as to the liability of the Medical
Examiner. It would seem that the Medical Examiner could be
held to either of two standards of conduct, a good faith standard
or a reasonable man standard. In Virginia, as elsewhere, a doctor
is held to the reasonable professional standard of his colleagues
0 7
and it would seem probable that since the Medical Examiner would
be performing the function of a doctor when he makes the determina-
tion of immediate need, he would be held to the doctor's standard.
On the other hand, if the statute requires the Medical Examiner to
determine from the transplanting surgeon that there is a case of
immediate need, then it would seem probable that only a good faith
requirement exists. Good faith means only an honest effort to ascertain
the facts upon which his exercise of discretion rests.0 8
"may" generally operates to confer discretion); Ocean Accident and Guarantee Co.
v. Milford Bank, 236 Ky. 457, 33 S.W.2d 312 (1930). (word "may" imports per-
mission or liberty to act).
0See United States Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Sullivan, 69 F.2d 412 (7 th Cir.
1934); Paper Stylists v. Fitchburg Paper Co., 9 F.R.D. 4 (N.D.N.Y. 1949); Murphy
v. Grand County, I Utah 2d 412, 268 P.2d 677 (1954).
67This is the view taken by Dr. Geoffrey Mann, the Chief Medical Examiner
of Virginia. Interview cited note 26 supra.
6'Although the statute has not yet been used, Dr. Geoffrey Mann is of the
opinion that this determination is for the transplanting surgeon. Interview cited
note 26 supra.
This view is consonant with the one taken by the National Academy of Sciences:
"Rigid safeguards should be developed with respect to the selection of prospective
donors .... An independent group of expert, mature physicians, none of whom
is directly engaged in the transplantation effort.., should agree ... as to the donor's
acceptability...." BOARD OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CARDIAC
TRANSPLANTATION IN MAN, February 28, 1968. (A copy of this statement can be
obtained from the National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D. C.)
6Harris v. Fall, 177 F. 79 (7th Cir. igio); Beach v. Chollet, 31 Ohio App. 8,
166 N.E. 145 (1928); Alexander v. Hill, 174 Va. 248, 6 S.E.2d 661 (1g4o).
OColket v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 52 F.2d 390 (8th Cir. 1931); In re Pine
Grove Canning Co., 226 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. La. 1963); People v. Bowman, 320 P.2d
70, 156 Cal. App. 2d 784 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
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After it has been determined that there is a recipient in immediate
need of an organ, the Medical Examiner must determine if there is
a decedent under his jurisdiction who might supply such an organ.
This determination is really the key to the statute because until it is
made, the Medical Examiner may not act. The statute makes no
attempt to define death or to cope with such difficult problems as
whether a donor who has provided a viable heart is really dead.
This is probably wise because such problems are not amenable to
a legislative approach. 69 Although the statute has not been used as
yet, the procedure that will be followed is that the family physician
or the attending physician at the hospital will make the determination
of death before the Medical Examiner enters the picture.7° This will
insure that the donor receives every benefit of medical science while
he still lives.
Once the determination has been made that there is a genuine
and immediate need for an organ and that there is a decedent who
falls under the jurisdiction of the Medical Examiner, the organ may
be provided where "no known objection by the next of kin is fore-
seen by the Chief Medical Examiner." The standard of conduct to
which the Medical Examiner will be held in deciding if such an
objection exists is not clear from the statute. If emphasis is placed on
the words "no known objection" then it would seem that the standard
is good faith.71 If, however, emphasis is placed on the words "is fore-
seen," then it would seem that the standard is the reasonable man.
7 2
While a means of resolving this ambiguity is not at hand, as a practical
matter the good faith standard is preferable. The spirit of the statute
is to facilitate transplants and save lives and in order to do this the
Medical Examiner should be encouraged to function under the statute
without fear of unnecessary liability.
A final problem is that the statute refers only to "the transplant-
ing surgeon" without stating any qualifications as to the experience
or ability that such a surgeon should possess. The American Medical
Association has promulgated requirements for surgeons and facilities
ODoctors are in agreement that death cannot readily be defined and that
each case must be decided on its own circumstances. Interview with Dr. D. E.
Andrews, Medical College of Virginia, in Richmond, Virginia, November 14, 1968.
"°Interview cited note 26 supra.
"'"No known objection" is a phrase that denotes a test of good faith. C.f.
Appel v. Morford, 62 Cal. App. 2d 36 144 P.2d 95, (Dist. Ct. App. 1943).
T'The word "foreseeable" is a word that suggests the reasonable man test of
"foreseeability." RESTATEM.ENT (SEoNo) oF TORTs § 283, comment b (1965).
STATUTORY COMMENTS
necessary in order to perform homotransplantation. 73 As the pre-
vailing medical opinion is an important factor in setting the legal
standard of care,74 the medical examiner may be charged with ascer-
taining that these medical standards are met before he provides an
organ for homotransplantation. While the probability of an inex-
perienced surgeon seeking to perform a transplantation is slight, the
possibility of abuse should not be ignored.75
The Virginia transplantation statute attempts to provide a pro-
cedure whereby a constant and viable source of organs can be made
available to transplanting surgeons. 76 In so doing, the effect of the
statute is to cast doubt on many of the old concepts concerning dead
bodies. While it is true that the transplantation statute raises several
legal problems, this must also be true of any attempt to legislate in a
new area. The significance of the statute is that the rights of the
deceased, his next of kin and the community as a whole have been
balanced, and the balance has been struck in favor of the community.
It is legislation of this type that will provide an atmosphere in which
law and medicine can better serve humanity.
JEFFREY R. REIDER
7-3Transplant procedures of body organs should be undertaken (a) only by
physicians who possess special medical knowledge and technical competence
developed through special training, study, and laboratory experience and
practice, and (b) in medical institutions with facilities adequate to protect
the health and well-being of the parties to the procedure.
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL AssocIATIoN (Adopted
by the American Medical Association House of Delegates on June 19, 1968). BOARD
ON MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CARDIAC TRANSPLANTATION IN MAN,
February 28, i968 (A copy of this statement can be obtained from the National
Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.).
"See Ayers v. Parry, 192 F.2d 18i (3 d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 98o
0952); Adkins v. Ropp, 105 Ind. App. 331, 14 N.E.2d 727 (1938); Johnson v. Colp,
211 Minn. 245, 3o N.V. 791 (1941); Harris v. Graham, 124 Okla. 196, 255 P. 710
(1926).
"sWashington Post, Dec. 7, 1968 § A, at l, Col. 3.
"The Chief Medical Examiner, Dr. Geoffrey Mann, while agreeing that the
statute is an important step forward, believes that the statute is still so restrictive
that its potential use is limited. Dr. Mann would prefer a statute that allowed the
Medical Examiner to take organs from a decedent falling under his jurisdiction
without any qualifications as to time or foreseeability of known objections from
the next of kin. Interview cited note 26 supra.
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APPENDIX I
The following table shows the antatomy statutes of thirty-five jurisdictions.
ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 174, et seq. (1958); Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-801, et seq.
1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-404, et seq. (Repl. Vol. i96o); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 7200 (West 1955); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-3-1 (1963); D.C. CODE
§ 2-2o3 (1967); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-2701, et seq. (Supp. 1967); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
91, § ig (Smith-Hurd 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 63-601, et seq. (1962); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 142.1 (Supp. 1968); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.300 (1963); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 17:2271, et seq. (1963); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2881 (1964); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 43, § 158 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 113, § 1, et seq. (1965);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.513(1), et seq. (Supp. 1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.14
(1946); MIss. CODE ANN. § 6709 (1953); MO. ANN. STAT. § 194.20 (1962); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 71-1o1, et seq. (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-49 (1963); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 12-7-4 (1954); N.Y. PulB. HEALTH LAW § 43211, et seq. (McKinney 1954);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-214 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-o6-14 (196o); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 9i , et seq. (1964); ORE. REV. STAT. § 97.170 (1967); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 35, § iogi, et seq. (1964); S.C. CODE ANN. § 9-501, et seq. (1962); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 53-5o4, et seq. (1966); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4583, et seq. (1960);
VA. CODE ANN. § 32-357 (Repl. Vol. 1964); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 63.08.060
(1967); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 18-11-12 (x966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 155.02 (1957).
APPENDIX II
The following table shows the donation statutes of forty-three jurisdictions.
ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 184 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 13.05.035 (1962) (eyes only); Aluz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-841, et seq. (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-4G6, et seq. (1960);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 71oo, et seq. (West Supp. 1968); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 91-3-5, et seq. (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-139 (Supp. 1968); D.C.
CODE § 2-251, et seq. (Supp. 1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 736-08, et seq. (1963); GA.
CODE ANN. § 88-2001, et seq. (Supp. 1968) (eyes only); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 64-14
(Act of April 1, 1967, ch. 5oF); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 42(a) (Smith-Hurd 1961);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-5io, et seq. (1967); IOWA CODE ANN. § 142.12 (Supp. 1968);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.352-56 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:2351-5 (1963);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2881, et seq. (1964) (eyes only); MD. ANN. CODE art.
43, § 149 (1965); MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 113, § 7-10 (Supp. 1967); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 14.523 (Supp. 1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.18 (Supp. 1968); Miss. AcTs (1966),
H.B. No. lO7O; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 194.190 (Supp. 1968); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 69-2311, et seq. (Supp. 1968); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-1339, et seq. (Supp. 1968);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 451.44o, et seq. (1963); NJ. REV. STAT. § 26:6-51 (1964) (eyes
only); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-11-1, et seq. (Supp. 1968); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW
§ 4201 (McKinney Supp. 1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9o-216.1, et seq. (1965); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 23-O6-O1 (Supp. 1968); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 105, et seq. (1964);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 97.132, et seq. (1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 500 1 (1964);
R.I. GEN. LAwS ANN. § 23-42-1 (Supp. 1966); S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-701 (1962) (eyes
only); S.D. CODE § 27.1302 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-601, et seq. (Supp. 1968);
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590-1 (1960); VA. CODE ANN. § 32-364.1 (Supp.
1968); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 68.08.25o , et seq. (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
16-19-i (1966) (eyes only); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 155-o6 (Supp. 1968).
